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Los sistemas educativos públicos basados en el lugar de residencia promueven la 
segregación espacial (i.e. por barrios o distritos escolares) de la población en 
función del ingreso (e.g. Epple y Romano, 2002). Se ha argumentado en la 
literatura que la introducción de alternativas privadas puede reducir los niveles de 
segregación al desvincular calidad educativa y lugar de residencia para las familias 
que utilizan la educación privada  (Nechyba, 1999). Por otra parte, es bien conocido 
que los así llamados efectos de vecindad constituyen otra fuerza segregadora en las 
áreas urbanas. En este artículo utilizamos un modelo de un área urbana con dos 
barrios (distritos escolares) para estudiar si la presencia de dichas externalidades 
sociológicas reduce o elimina este efecto de la educación privada. El análisis 
demuestra que los efectos de vecindad pueden en efecto inhibir la mezcla de 
grupos de diferente nivel de ingreso inducida por la educación privada. Esto 
ocurrirá si la mejor escuela pública se sitúa en el barrio que genera mejores efectos 
de vecindad. No obstante, también puede suceder que promuevan que familias de 
renta elevada que utilizan una escuela privada convivan con familias de renta baja 
que mandan a sus hijos a una escuela pública en el barrio o comunidad con los 
efectos de vecindad más beneficiosos. 
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Residence-based public education systems promote income segregation across 
neighborhoods or school districts (e.g. Epple and Romano, 2002). It has been 
argued that allowing private schools to enter the market may reduce the levels of 
income segregation because private education severs the link among school quality 
and place of residence for those using a private school. On the other hand, the so-
called neighborhood effects constitute another segregating force in urban areas. We 
use a two-neighborhood model of an urban economy in order to study whether 
such externalities inhibit the desegregating effects of private education or not. The 
analysis reveals that they may indeed reduce or completely eliminate private 
education induced income mixing. This will happen if the best public school is 
located where neighborhood effects are most beneficial. However, it may also be 
the case that neighborhood effects promote the mixing of high income households 
using a private school with low income ones using a public school in the 
neighborhood providing the most beneficial neighborhood effects. 
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”The micro-foundations of local goods and services need further the-
oretical and empirical investigations. Many such goods (such as crime
prevention and schooling) depend fundamentally on peer and neighbor-
hood eﬀects, and predictions can change fundamentally as such eﬀects are
introduced into the analysis. Similarly, locally provided goods may have
private alternatives that can alter predictions when included explicitly in
the analysis”.
Epple and Nechyba, 2004
”The key theoretical feature of [neighborhood eﬀects] models concerns
how individuals with diﬀerent attributes are allocated across neighbor-
hoods... Much of the interest in neighborhood conﬁgurations, in turn,
focuses on the extent to which neighborhoods are segregated by income
or other attributes... Segregation by income, for example, provides a basis
for understanding persistence in economic status across generations: poor
households are consigned to poor neighborhoods, whose eﬀects make it
more likely their children are poor.”
Durlauf, 2004
T h ea i mo ft h i sp a p e ri st oa n a l y z et h ei m p a c to ft h es o - c a l l e dn e i g h b o r h o o de ﬀects
on school choice and neighborhood demographic composition in urban economies.
More precisely, we want to answer two main questions: First, how do neighbor-
hood eﬀects aﬀect the choice among public and private education in a single location
setting? Second, does private education reduce income segregation across neighbor-
hoods when such externalities are relevant? With these objectives in mind, we build a
model of a city in which (i) there exists a set of tuition-free public schools that follow
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A:residence-based admission policies, and in which (ii) competitive private schools can
freely enter the market.
Neighborhood eﬀects are sociological externalities (peer eﬀects operating at school
and community level, role models, rules of behavior, crime, etc.) whereby a household
socioeconomic outcomes and, thus, utility are aﬀected by the identity of its neighbors
(see for example Durlauf, 2004). Neighborhood eﬀects are receiving increasing atten-
tion by both empirical and theoretical researchers from diﬀerent ﬁelds of economics.
But, why is it relevant to consider them in an urban model with public schooling and
opting-out?
Multi-community models of urban public ﬁnance (Westhoﬀ, 1977, Fernández and
Rogerson, 1998, and Epple et al., 1984 are three examples) typically reduce the com-
munity characteristics space to two dimensions: the quality (quantity) of a local
public good and a price variable (housing price or gross-of-tax housing price in mod-
els with housing or income tax rate in models without housing). This assumption
is analytically convenient (see Schmidheiny, 2002). Moreover, it is an adequate sim-
pliﬁcation in many cases, as the local public good can be interpreted as an index of
an n-dimension vector of characteristics (see the empirical applications by Epple and
Sieg, 1999 and Epple et al., 2001).
Consider a multi-community model with housing and without private alternatives
to the locally provided good (education). Suppose communities diﬀer in how much
of this good they oﬀer to their residents and in the price of housing. In this setting,
it is possible to rank communities according to their level of provision (equivalently,
to their price of housing). Housing markets then allocate households to locations ac-
cording to their willingness to pay for the locally provided good. Suppose households
vary along a single dimension (income, preferences). If the willingness to pay for
living in a better location varies monotonically with the variable in which households
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A:vary, equilibrium will exhibit perfect segregation across locations.
Consider now what happens if private alternatives to the locally provided good are
allowed for in this model. As it has been emphasized by Epple and Nechyba (2004),
this is especially relevant for the good in which we focus our attention: education. In
this case, diﬀerent households value locations according to diﬀerent sets of attributes.
In particular, households opting for a private school do not take into account the
quality of local public schools. If communities only vary along this dimension apart
from the price variable, then, they will live in the lowest (housing or tax) price
community. That community will also be inhabited by low income households who
use the local public school. Therefore, this model predicts that private education
will induce income mixing within communities. This is a basic result in Bearse et al.
(2001), which is also in Martínez-Mora (2003). Advocates of voucher systems adduce
this as an advantage of such policies on equity grounds (Nechyba, 1999).
It is a stylized fact, nevertheless, that in the real world households in the private
sector reside in diﬀerent communities with diﬀerent housing prices (see, for example,
the evidence in Luengo-Prado and Volij, 2003). This can only be explained using
a model in which locations vary not only according to public school quality but
also according to other relevant dimension(s). Reducing the location characteristics
space to two dimensions is thus a natural assumption in models without opting-
out. Furthermore, it is an adequate simpliﬁcation for studying important aspects
of sector choice or the impact of alternative education systems on the dynamics of
income distribution (as in Bearse et al., 2001). But it is necessary to investigate how
urban markets for education work when opting-out of public education is allowed for
and locations diﬀer in more than two characteristics.
Several characteristics could be considered for this: endogenous amenities such as
commercial activity, crime and social capital; exogenous amenities such as natural and
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A:historical amenities and distance to center or housing quality. In this paper, we focus
on one important type of endogenous amenities: neighborhood eﬀects. When these
externalities are at work, households location choices are aﬀected by each community
social capital. Consequently, they constitute a potential segregating force in urban
settings which may inhibit the incentives households in the private sector have to mix
with poor households in low housing (tax) price communities3.
To our knowledge, no paper has investigated the impact neighborhood eﬀects have
on neighborhood and school composition when opting-out is allowed for. Nechyba’s
computational analyses (e.g. 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003) have shed light on communities
and schools composition when communities are made up by several neighborhoods
which diﬀer in exogenous quality. In his 1999 paper, this author presents a very rich
model in which jurisdictions are endowed with an exogenous stock of heterogeneous
houses, households diﬀer by wealth and students’ ability and peer group eﬀects aﬀect
students’ achievement. This model serves as the basis for a computational general
equilibrium counterpart which is used in several policy experiments. In this setting,
private education is shown to promote income mixing within communities (not neigh-
borhoods). The model can be interpreted as if each group of homogeneous houses
make up a neighborhood. Under such interpretation neighborhoods diﬀer in quality.
However, as quality is exogenous the model can hardly be interpreted as including
neighborhood eﬀects. As the author himself recognizes (Nechyba, 2003), this makes
it inadequate for studying the evolution of neighborhood conﬁgurations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In section 3
we present a digression on the mechanisms through which neighborhood eﬀects may
aﬀect sector choice in a single-location context. We show that these local externalities
3See Bénabou (1996) for a model in which neighborhood eﬀects are enough for generating perfect
income segregation in urban areas.
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A:may be relevant to the choice among both educational sectors, as recent empirical
evidence suggests (e.g. Figlio and Stone, 2001). In section 4, we introduce multiple
location alternatives into the analysis. We hold sector choice constant and establish
a number of restrictions (i) the equilibrium allocation of households to communities
and (ii) the equilibrium vector of housing prices must satisfy. Using all these results,
section 5 analyzes the overall segregation patterns across neighborhoods and schools
that may arise in equilibrium. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The model we present in this section is based on the one in Martínez-Mora (2003).
In order to create the simplest adequate framework to study the issues of interest
to this paper, we modify it in two respects. First, we assume that school quality is
exogenous. Consequently, there is no need to explicitly model public school ﬁnance,
the taxation system or the voting process. This simplifying assumption allows us to
interpret locations as neighborhoods or communities that diﬀer in the quality of public
schooling. We also assume the existence of a hierarchy of public school qualities. This
seems an adequate assumption since such hierarchy arises as a natural outcome in
multi-community models with local school ﬁnance (Epple et al., 1993), or in single
jurisdiction ones with neighborhood schooling (Epple and Romano, 2002). To be
precise, in those models only equilibria in which public schools diﬀer in quality are
stable4.
This simpliﬁcation forces us to be cautious about the conclusions to be drawn
from the analysis. In the real world, the quality of a public school is related to its
demographic composition through a variety of channels (peer group eﬀects, economic
resources, students eﬀort, parents involvement, etc.) Consequently, the lessons one
4For an explanation, see for example Fernández (2001).
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A:can extract from a particular solution (equilibrium) depend on the compatibility
among the demographic composition of a school and its level of exogenous quality.5
The second departure from the model in Martínez-Mora (2003) is the introduction
of neighborhood eﬀects. As we explained in the introduction, neighborhood eﬀects are
sociological externalities whereby the utility of a household is aﬀected by the identity
of its neighbors. When they are relevant to households’ well-being and households
are aware of it, their residential location decisions are aﬀected by the demographic
composition of each neighborhood.
The model has two neighborhoods that we consider the set of neighborhoods
within a city. Locations can also be interpreted as communities within a metropoli-
tan area. The neighborhoods have exogenous boundaries and each of them has a
ﬁxed housing stock. Houses are homogenous and oﬀered along a supply schedule hor-
izontal until the neighborhood capacity is reached and vertical at that level. These
assumptions about local housing markets are not essential but considerably simplify
the analysis. Residential mobility across locations is costless.
The city (metropolitan area) is populated by a continuum of households whose
mass is normalized to 1. Each household is composed of one adult -the decision-
maker- and one school-aged child. Households diﬀer by their exogenous endowment of
the numeraire: income. Population is characterized by a continuous density function
f(y) strictly positive in its domain. D ≡ [y,y] ⊂ <+. Each household consumes one
(and only one) unit of housing at price ph. We assume that housing capacity in the
economy is just enough to house the population.
5This assumption, however, is not stringent. As the analysis below will demonstrate, better
public schools are always used by better-oﬀ households. Public school quality diﬀerentials across
neighborhoods within a school district, in turn, can only be caused by diﬀerences in demographic
inputs (e.g. peer eﬀects). It is reasonable and common in the literature (e.g. Epple and Romano,
2002) to assume that better-oﬀ households provide more beneﬁcial demographic inputs.
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A:There exist three private commodities in the economy: educational services, hous-
ing and a composite good -the numeraire. We assume that households’ utility also
depends on their neighborhood level of social capital through neighborhood eﬀects.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the local externality a household is exposed to in a
particular location depends on the local level of social capital. To simplify matters
this is assumed to be increasing in neighborhood average income.
Assumption 1 Neighborhood level of social capital, θ, (or at least households’ per-
ceptions about it6) is a strictly increasing and continuous function of neighborhood
average income:θ = θ(y); θ0(y) > 0.
Preferences are therefore deﬁned over school quality (x), the level of social capital
in the neighborhood (θ) and consumption of the numeraire (b). Because all houses
are homogenous and each household consumes exactly one unit of this good, we do
not include it in our utility function.
Assumption 2 Households have identical preferences captured by the utility function
U(x,θ,b)=u(x,θ)+z(b). Moreover, u(x,θ) and z(b) are both increasing in (x,θ) and
b, respectively, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable for all (x,θ,b) >> 0.F i n a l l y ,
u(x,θ) is strictly quasi-concave, while z(b) is strictly concave.






Further, in order to avoid technical diﬃculties, we assume y is high enough so
as to allow households with such income level to buy a house in the most expensive
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A:neighborhood. This guarantees a positive level of disposable income and of numeraire
consumption for all households in every location alternative.
Therefore, preferences are continuous, strictly convex and strictly monotonic.
Moreover, school quality, neighborhood eﬀects and the numeraire behave as nor-
mal goods, i.e. household demand for all of them increases with income. Finally,
zero consumption of the numeraire or of school quality cannot be compensated by
any amount of other commodities.
This preference schedule allows for several interpretations of θ. In the most ba-
sic one, households have preferences over private consumption, the quality of the
neighborhood in which they live and the quality of the school to which they send
their children. In this view, θ represents neighborhood quality, which increases with
mean income. As in Brueckner et al. (1999), a neighborhood’s endogenous quality
may depend on the availability of restaurants or public facilities such as parks or
swimming-pools. Thus, the existence of non-market interactions that make the level
of local social capital relevant are not necessary to justify the analysis.
Alternatively, and this is the interpretation we adopt in this paper, one can think
of θ as representing the level of social capital in a neighborhood. Under this inter-
pretation θ serves to capture the role of social non-market interactions. Given that
the socioeconomic composition of the neighborhood where a child grows aﬀects his
acquisition of human capital, households have preferences over private consumption
and the level of human capital acquired by the child. The utility function allows for
complementarities among school quality and the local level of social capital. Hence,
u(x,θ) can be interpreted as u(x,θ)=s(h(x,θ)),w h e r eh(x,θ) is a function relating
school and neighborhood social capital to the level of human capital acquired by the
child and s(h) captures the household preferences over the child’s level of human
capital. This interpretation should be kept in mind.
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A:School quality is considered a private good, i.e. the beneﬁts it provides are exclud-
able and perfectly divisible. Each neighborhood has a public school. As we explained
above, public school quality (E) is assumed to be exogenous to simplify matters. This
allows us to ignore questions related to public school ﬁnance and the corresponding
political economy problem. Furthermore, we assume there exists a hierarchy of public
school qualities such that E1 <E 2.
Besides the public schooling system, there exists a competitive market in which
every household can acquire any level of school quality (x) at competitive price px.
The private educational sector produces school quality from the numeraire, following
a technology of production which exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to
the number of students, n, and the quality level, x. The corresponding cost function
is c(x,n)=x · n. The marginal cost of providing one extra unit of school quality to
one student for private producers is equal to 1. Hence, px =1 .
Note we assume households opting for a private school can always ﬁnd a private
school which oﬀers exactly the level of school quality they desire. While this assump-
tion may seem extreme, it is a useful simpliﬁcation which does not alter the essence
of the public-private school choice problem (see Epple and Romano, 1996a). It has an
important implication: as education is a normal good and demand for school quality
rises monotonically with income, each private school is attended by students belong-
ing to households from a single income level. In other words, the private education
sector perfectly segregates students across schools according to their parents income.
Public and private schools are mutually exclusive options and only public schools
have a residential requirement for attendance. That is to say, households whose
children attend a public school cannot supplement their consumption of education in
the private sector; and households who want to use a particular public school must
reside in the neighborhood where it is located.
9
centrA:
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces
A:Every adult decides: (i) where (in which neighborhood) to reside; (ii) to send her
child to the local public school there or to a private school; and -if she chooses pri-
vate schooling- (iii) to allocate income between consumption of school quality and nu-
meraire. In our model with two neighborhoods, there exist four school sector-location
alternatives: ”public education-neighborhood 1”, ”public education-neighborhood 2”,
”private education-neighborhood 1”, ”private education-neighborhood 2”. For nota-
tion simplicity we will denote them ”PUB1”, ”PUB2”, ”PR1”a n d” PR2”, respec-
tively.
Adults are price-takers and they take all neighborhood variables as given. They
adopt all decisions in one stage, taking into account the exogenous vector of public
school qualities (E1 <E 2) and households’ (correct) expectations over the equilibrium
vector of housing prices and neighborhood qualities e∗ =( θ1,p 1
h,θ2,p 2
h).
As in Martínez-Mora (2003), the notion of equilibrium we adopt here is the free
mobility equilibrium concept. In a model without voting and taxation and with
neighborhood eﬀects the deﬁnition is:
Deﬁnition 1 Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a partition of households across neigh-
borhoods and schools, an allocation (x,θ,b) across households and a vector of neigh-
borhood qualities and housing prices e∗ =( θ1,p 1
h,θ2,p 2
h) satisfying:
1. Rational choices: for each household, the pair (x,θ,b) associated to their choice
of neighborhood and school provides the maximum utility among the alternatives avail-
able in their choice set. This implies that no household wants to move to another
location or to shift school.
2. Housing market equilibrium: housing demand equals housing (ﬁxed) supply in
every neighborhood.
3. The demographic composition of each neighborhood is such that θ1 = y1 and
10
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A:θ2 = y2,w h e r eyi stands for neighborhood i average income.
A central issue in this paper is the emergence of income mixing or income seg-
regation across neighborhoods (schools). Consequently, it is necessary to precisely
deﬁne what we mean by income mixing and perfect income segregation.
Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium:
1. Exhibits perfect income segregation across neighborhoods (schools) if house-
holds living in (sending their children to) each of them belong to a single income
interval.
2. Leads to income mixing within neighborhoods (schools) if at least one neigh-
borhood (school) is inhabited (used) by households from at least two diﬀerent income
intervals.
Next, we obtain the induced preferences of a household with income y living in
a neighborhood with housing price ph, social capital θ and public school quality E.
Given the preference conﬁguration we adopt in the model, the indirect utility function
of a household in the public sector depends on the quality of the public school and of
the neighborhood where they live and on the price of housing there. The expression
is given by:
v(E,θ,y − ph)=u(E,θ)+z(y − ph) (1)
Every household has a demand function for private school quality. It depends on the
level of ”disposable income” (income minus the price of a house) and on the level of
social capital in the neighborhood:
x∗ = x(θ,y − ph) (2)
To obtain the indirect utility function of a household who opts out of public education
we plug this demand function and the household’s budget constraint into the utility
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A:function:
w(θ,y − ph)=u(x(θ,y − ph),θ)+z(y − ph − x(θ,y − ph)) (3)
The induced preference relation for a household who chooses between public and
private schooling is:
V (E,θ,y − ph)=m a x[ v(E,θ,y − ph),w(θ,y − ph)] (4)
3 A digression on sector choice within neighborhoods
This section investigates the channels through which neighborhood eﬀects may aﬀect
households choices among public and private education within a particular location
(i.e. when residential location is ﬁxed). This analysis is the ﬁrst contribution of the
present paper.
Along the lines of Martínez-Mora (2003), let b Ei be the level of public education
quality that makes a household living in neighborhood i indiﬀerent among public and
private education. b Ei is a continuous and diﬀerentiable function implicitly deﬁned by
v(b Ei,θi,y−pi
h)=w(θi,y−pi
h). Hence, b Ei depends on the household’s level of income,
the price of housing in the neighborhood and its level of social capital. We can then
write: b Ei = b Ei(θ,y − pi
h). Such level of public school quality determines a threshold
for the choice among public and private education. For households with income y
such that b Ei(θ,y − pi
h) >E i, the quality of the public school in the neighborhood
is not enough and opt for a private alternative of higher quality. For those with a
level of income y such that b Ei(θ,y−pi
h) <E i, in turn, the public school fulﬁlls their
demand for school quality and they prefer to use it.
Lemma 1 1. b E(θ,y − ph) is monotonically increasing in y − ph, ∀y>p h.
2. b E(θ,y − ph) is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in θ if uθx(x,θ) > 0
(uθx(x,θ) < 0), ∀y>p h.
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A:Proof. 1. Diﬀerentiate v( b E(θ,y−ph),θ,y−ph)=w(θ,y−ph) with respect to (y−ph)
and solve to obtain:
∂ b E(θ,y − ph)
∂(y − ph)
=
z0 [y − ph − x(θ,y − ph)] − z0(y − ph)
uE( b E(θ,y − ph),θ)
> 0 (5)
assumption 3 assures a strictly positive demand for private education when private
schooling is chosen. Hence, y −ph −x(θ,y −ph) <y−ph, ∀y and strict concavity of
z(·) guarantees that this derivative is positive.
2. Diﬀerentiate v( b E(θ,y − ph),θ,y− ph)=w(θ,y − ph) with respect to θ and
solve to obtain:
∂ b E(θ,y − ph)
∂θ
=
uθ(x(θ,y − ph),θ) − uθ( b E(θ,y − ph),θ)
uE(b E(θ,y − ph),θ)
> 0 (6)
The sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the numerator, which in turn
depends on the sign of the cross-derivative uθx(x,θ). For all y>p h, x(θ,y − ph) >
b E(θ,y − ph). Otherwise b E(·) could not make this household indiﬀerent between
the public school and their most preferred private alternative. This is obvious as
private education is costly and reduces consumption of the numeraire. Consequently,
if uθx(x,θ) > 0 (uθx(x,θ) < 0), this derivative will be positive (negative).
The ﬁrst part of the lemma shows that the introduction of neighborhood eﬀects
does not alter the way in which income aﬀects households choice among public and
private schooling within a particular location with respect to the case without them
(see Martínez Mora, 2003). Within a neighborhood, household income is the only
source of variation in demand for school quality. Because school quality is normal,
richer households demand more school quality. Given the ﬁxed quality level of the
public school, households with income above a certain threshold opt out of public
education to receive higher quality private schooling. Therefore, the distribution of
households across both educational sectors exhibits perfect income segregation within
a particular location. This is conﬁrmed by proposition 1:
13
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A:Proposition 1 Every neighborhood inhabited by households sending their children
to a private school and by others using the local public school, exhibits perfect in-
come sorting across educational sectors, with higher income households sending their




h),l e te y be such that Ej = b E(θj, e y − p
j
h).B e c a u s eb E(·) is
increasing in y, all households with income y >e y,s a t i s f yEj < b E(θj,y− p
j
h),a n d
they strictly prefer a private alternative. Households with income y <e y, in turn,
Ej > b E(θj,y−p
j
h), and they strictly prefer the public school. That households in the
private sector acquire school services of higher quality is obvious. Otherwise, they not
would be willing to leave the free public school and to pay for a private alternative.
Sector choice is also inﬂuenced by the price of housing, the quality of the public
school and by neighborhood eﬀects. As in Martínez-Mora (2003), ﬁrst, the better
the local public school the less households opt for a private alternative; on the other
hand, the higher the price of housing the lower the level of households’ disposable
income and consequently private school attendance.
There are at least two mechanisms whereby neighborhood eﬀects may aﬀect sector
choice. First, they may alter the public school quality threshold above which a
household prefers public education ( b E). Second, they may change public school
quality itself. Therefore, the answer to the question of how social capital aﬀects
opting-out in a single-location setting hinges on how it interacts with school quality
in the production of human capital.
Suppose (x,θ) are complements (i.e. uxθ(x,θ) > 0). This may be, for exam-
ple, because networking contacts are more likely to be useful if the young receive
14
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A:higher quality schooling, or because children’s access to more successful role mod-
els makes parents investments in their children’s education more beneﬁcial. In this
case, exposition to better neighborhood eﬀects makes school quality more attractive.
Consequently, increases in social capital in a particular neighborhood rise residents’
demand for school quality.7 If school quality and social capital are substitutes (i.e.
uxθ(x,θ) > 0), in turn, the opposite relation holds and increases in the local level of
social capital reduce the demand for school quality.
From this analysis, it is possible to extract several lessons about the impact of
neighborhood eﬀects over sector choice within single location settings. If (x,θ) are
complements (substitutes), a rise in θ, ceteris paribus, should increase (decrease) the
number of households who are dissatisﬁed with the local public school. As a result
private school attendance should increase (decrease).
As we claimed above, the quality of a public school may be related to the social
capital of the neighborhood where it is located and from which it attracts students.
Consequently, while the impact of neighborhood socioeconomic composition on house-
holds demand for school quality only depends on the sign of uθx(x,θ),i t se ﬀect on
private school attendance also hinges on how the quality of the local public school
evolves with θ.
Empirical research on these issues is still scarce. The available empirical evi-
dence suggests that community variables indeed aﬀect sector choice. Lankford and
Wyckoﬀ (1997), Lankford, Lee and Wyckoﬀ (1995), Fairlie and Resch (2002) and
Conlon and Kimenyi (1991) obtain evidence supporting that more white households
7This result provides an explanation of why higher income households demand higher quality
education which does not require diﬀerences in preferences, information or students ability: apart
from income eﬀects, it may be that children from better-oﬀ households obtain greater beneﬁts from
investments in education because they grow in a better social environment.
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A:choose private schooling where the proportion of black households is higher. Figlio
and Stone (2001) ﬁnd reductions in local crime rates diminish opting-out of public
education. Both results can be interpreted as evidence supporting the existence of an
inverse relation between social capital and private school attendance. Whether these
results arise because public school quality increases with social capital or because
social capital and school quality are substitutes or even for both reasons remains
unanswered.
4 Residential location choices and housing prices
In this section, we relax the assumption that residential location is ﬁxed. We take
the choice between public and private education as given in order to investigate how
households in each educational sector choose where to live. The objective is to de-
termine (separately) the segregation patterns that may characterize the equilibrium
distribution of both groups of households across neighborhoods. The analysis yields
results on how rational residential location choices depend on and shape the equilib-
rium vector of housing prices and neighborhood qualities e∗ =( θ1,p 1
h,θ2,p 2
h).
In all the analysis below we assume u(E1,θ1) 6= u(E2,θ2).C o n s i d e r ﬁrst how
households in the public sector choose where to live. From a household point of view
locations are characterized by the vector (E,θ,ph), i.e., by the quality of the public
school, the level of social capital in the neighborhood and the price of a house there.
Taking this into account, we are able to prove:




h and households using public education live in both neighborhoods,








h, all households using a public school live in neighborhood j.
Proof. 1. We ﬁrst prove that indiﬀerence curves of v(E,θ,y−ph) in the (u(E,θ),p h)
plane satisfy a slope rising in income property. Let M(E,θ,y − ph) be the slope of
















z0(y − ph)2 > 0 (8)
As a consequence, indiﬀerence curves of households with diﬀerent levels of income
cross at most once in [u(E,θ),p] space (see ﬁgure 1)8. On the other hand, given
that v(·) is continuous in income, if both neighborhoods are inhabited by households
attending the public school, there must be a level of income e yu that makes households
indiﬀerent between both alternatives. The single-crossing property then implies that
all households with income y>e yu strictly prefer to live in the neighborhood with
the highest housing price -neighborhood j-, and that households with income y<e yu
s t r i c t l yp r e f e rt ol i v ei nt h eo n ew i t ht he lowest housing price -neighborhood i (this
is formally proved for example in Epple et al., 1993).







If housing prices were equal in both neighborhoods, every household choosing a
public school would prefer to live in the neighborhood oﬀering the combination of
public school quality and social capital yielding the largest u(E,θ).T h e r e f o r e , i f
both neighborhoods have households using their public school, housing prices must






z0(y − p)3 < 0
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Figure 1
compensate the utility gap stemming from public school and neighborhood quality
diﬀerences. In other words, neighborhood j must have a higher price of housing for
the economy to be in equilibrium. On the other hand, perfect income segregation
arises because richer households are willing to oﬀer higher bids for a house in the
best neighborhood (j). They do so because their marginal valuation of numeraire
consumption is lower.
Proposition 2 provides a single-crossing condition guaranteing the emergence of
prefect income segregation across locations when they diﬀer along more than two
dimensions9. This condition constitutes by itself a contribution of this paper. It
depends on one assumption in the model apart from separability of utility. It is the
assumption that houses are homogenous and of ﬁxed size. If housing were malleable
9Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple et al. (2001) follow a similar approach. These authors suppose
communities provide a single composite good which incorporates locally provided goods, environ-
mental amenities and other community attributes. Their single-crossing condition is then deﬁned
over this composite good and the gross-of-tax price of housing.
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would not be obtained without further assumptions. The assumptions needed are not
stringent, however. For example, if utility is deﬁned as U(Q,θ,h,b)=u(Q,θ,h)+
z(b),w h e r eh stands for housing and z(·) is strictly concave, it can be shown that a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for this result is that the price elasticity of housing
demand be smaller than one in absolute terms. This result also extends to models
with n locational attributes. Furthermore, the available empirical evidence about the
price elasticity of housing demand strongly supports the necessary and suﬃcient (see
Whitehead, 1999, for a review).
Importantly, note that proposition 2 does not require either Ei <E j or θi <θ j,
although at least one of these inequalities must be satisﬁed. Suppose for example
that Ei >E j, θi >θ j,w i t hu(Ei,θi) <u (Ej,θj). If this is so and the economy
is in the case in part 1 of proposition 2, richer households in the public sector will
reside in neighborhood j, where the public school is worse. They are willing to
give up on some consumption of school quality in order to enjoy larger levels of social
capital. Hence, our model with neighborhood eﬀects shows that, for households using
a public school, a higher level of household income does not always mean consumption
of higher quality education.
We now investigate location choices of households who opt for a private school.
The analysis provides results on how they allocate themselves to neighborhoods.
Moreover, their rational behavior imposes further restrictions on the equilibrium
vector of housing prices and neighborhood qualities.
The slope of indiﬀerence curves corresponding to households who acquire private









z0(y − ph − x(θ,y − ph))
> 0 (9)
19It is equal to the marginal beneﬁt of social capital in terms of the numeraire. There-
fore, in response to a marginal increase in θ, a household using a private school is
willing to increase its bid for housing in an amount equal to the marginal beneﬁtt h e y
obtain from social capital.
The allocation of households opting for a private school to neighborhoods will
exhibit perfect income segregation if S(θ,y − ph) varies monotonically with income.
More speciﬁcally, for richer households to live in neighborhoods with higher levels of
social capital (and housing prices), it must be monotonically increasing in income.
That is to say, richer households must obtain a larger marginal beneﬁt of social capital







z0(y − ph − x(·)) − uθ(x(·),θ) · z00(y − ph − x(·))
z0(y − ph)2
(10)
This expression is not necessarily positive. We consequently adopt the following
plausible assumption:
Assumption 4 S(θ,y − ph) is monotonically increasing in y.
It is straightforward to show that a suﬃcient condition for assumption 4 to hold
requires school quality and neighborhood social capital to be complements or unre-
lated goods, i.e. uθx(x,θ) ≥ 0.
Proposition 3 makes use of assumption 4 to establish optimal residential choices
of households who send their children to a private school.





h and both neighborhoods are inhabited by households using a pri-
vate school, these households perfectly segregate by income across neighborhoods, with




h, all households using a private school live in neighborhood j.
Proof. 1. By assumption 4, indiﬀerence curves corresponding to diﬀerent levels
of income cross each other at most once in (θ,ph) space (see ﬁgure 2). If neigh-
borhoods i and j are both populated by households who acquire private education,
continuity of w(·) implies that there exists a level of income e yr that makes house-
holds choosing a private school indiﬀerent between both locational alternatives. The
single-crossing condition then implies that all households in the private sector with
income y>e yr strictly prefer to live in the neighborhood with the highest housing
price -neighborhood j-, and that all of them with income y<e yr strictly prefer to live
in that with the lowest housing price -neighborhood i (again, this has been formally
proved for example in Epple et al., 1993).
2. Clearly, in this case, wi(θi,y− pi






Because households opting-out of public education only care about the social
interactions they are exposed to in diﬀerent locations, they value more those neigh-
borhoods with higher levels of social capital. Consequently, if this group is present
in both neighborhoods, housing prices must compensate the social capital gap be-
tween neighborhoods, i.e. they will be higher where the level of social capital is higher.
Proposition 3 also reveals that, under assumption 4, in equilibria in which both neigh-
borhoods have residents using a private alternative, this group of households will also
be perfectly segregated by income across neighborhoods. Moreover, richer households
will be living in the neighborhood with the larger pair (θ,ph) -neighborhood j,s a y .
This occurs because assumption 4 guarantees higher income households are willing
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to oﬀer higher bids for a house in that neighborhood. This assumption holds if (x,θ)
are complements or unrelated goods, something not assured if they are substitutes.
The intuitive explanation is the following: in response to an increase in θ,h o u s e -
holds opting-out of public education are willing to increase their bids for a house in
a given neighborhood in an amount equal to the marginal beneﬁto fθ in terms of
the numeraire. How this marginal beneﬁt varies with income depends on how the
marginal utility of social capital and of the numeraire change with income. Given the
preference conﬁguration in the model, richer households always have a lower marginal
valuation of the numeraire. Moreover, if (x,θ) are complements or unrelated goods,
marginal utility of social capital is non-decreasing in income. This is because, as x is
normal, the amount of this good a household acquires increases with income, which
in turn rises marginal utility of social capital if these goods are complements or does
not change it if they are independent. On the other hand, marginal utility of social
capital may fall with income if (x,θ) are substitutes. The reason is that as income
22rises, consumption of school quality also increases and the household places a lower
marginal value on social capital.
5 Equilibrium neighborhood conﬁgurations
In this section, we ask whether and under which circumstances the distribution of
households with diﬀerent income to neighborhoods exhibits income mixing in our
model. We investigate this issue by focusing on equilibria in which some households
opt out of the public system and others remain using a public school. It is immediate
to show that all stable equilibrium in which no household opts for the private sector
exhibits perfect income sorting across neighborhoods. Moreover, in such equilibrium,
high income households live in the neighborhood with the highest quality public
school, which consequently has the highest level of social capital. For exposition
purposes, we also restrict attention to empirically relevant equilibria in which the
poorest households in the economy prefer a public school over any private alternative.
Our deﬁnition of income mixing (see section 2) requires at least one neighbor-
hood to be populated by households from at least two separated income intervals.
Lemma 2 states a necessary condition for the emergence of income mixing within
neighborhoods.
Lemma 2 For income mixing to characterize equilibrium some households with higher
income than the highest income households choosing PUB2 (i.e. living in neighbor-
hood 2 and using its public school) must live in neighborhood 1 and acquire private
education.
Proof. For a neighborhood to be populated by households from at least two sep-
arated income intervals, households’ location choices between neighborhoods 1 and
2 must change at least twice as income grows. For neighborhood choices to change
23at least twice as income grows, in turn, there must be households living in 1 with
higher income than a set of those living in 2. We prove that the only possibility for
this to occur is that stated in the lemma. Proposition 2 establishes that if house-
holds with income y0 prefer PUB2 over PUB1, those with income y>y 0 also prefer
PUB2. By proposition 3, if households with income y00 prefer PR2 to PR1,t h o s e
with income y>y 00 also prefer PR2. Furthermore, it is immediate to show that the
same occurs with alternatives PR2 and PUB1: if households with income b y000 prefer
PR2 to PUB1 all households with income y>y 000 prefer PR2 too. Therefore, there
exists only one possibility for location choices to change from 2 to 1 as income rises:
some households with higher income than those choosing PUB2 must opt for PR1,
i.e. live in neighborhood 1 and acquire private education.
In our model, the neighborhood attributes households in the public sector value
are the quality of the public school and the level of social capital. Households using a
private school, in turn, only care about social capital. Keeping this in mind, and given
E1 <E 2 there exist three diﬀerent conﬁgurations of neighborhood characteristics,
depending on the diﬀerence among θ1 and θ2. First, the neighborhood endowed with
the best public school may have the highest level of social capital and, thus, provide
the most beneﬁcial neighborhood eﬀects. That is to say:
(a) θ1 <θ 2, which implies u(E1,θ1) <u (E2,θ2).
Clearly, in this case all households in the economy would like to live in neigh-
borhood 2 if housing prices were equal in both neighborhoods. Obviously, space
restrictions make this impossible and housing prices act as screening devices that
allocate households to locations.
Alternatively, neighborhood 1 demographic composition may generate the most
beneﬁcial externalities. Two possibilities arise, as the larger level of social capital
24may be enough or not to compensate households in the public sector for the lower
quality of neighborhood 1 public school. That is to say, either:
(b) θ1 >θ 2,w i t hu(E1,θ1) >u (E2,θ2);o r
(c) θ1 >θ 2,w i t hu(E1,θ1) <u (E2,θ2).
Case (b) is similar to case (a) in the sense that all households have incentives for
living in the same place. In this situation, if housing prices were equal across locations
all households would prefer to live in neighborhood 1. Again, housing prices would
serve to select which households end up living there. In case (c), in turn, households
in both educational sectors have ex-ante opposing preferences for neighborhoods. For
equal housing prices, households who send their oﬀspring to a private school have a
preference for living where the level of social capital is larger (neighborhood 1). On
the other hand, households who choose a public school prefer living in 2. The higher
quality of the public school there compensates them for the lower level of social
capital.
For the purposes of the analysis it is convenient to classify these cases on the basis
of the incentives structure they generate for households in both educational sectors.
According to this criterion, it is possible to distinguish between:
(1) Situations in which all households (those using a public school and those opting
for a private alternative) have incentives to live in the same neighborhood (cases
a and b).
(2) Situations in which the incentives households in the private sector have are
opposite to those of households using a public school (case c).
         Cas e ( c) Pr op osition 4 states a necessary and suﬃcient condition for in-
come mixing to arise in equilibria in which the economy is in case (c). Let nu, nr,
25n1, n2 denote, respectively, the mass of households using a public school, the mass
of households choosing a private option, and each neighborhood’s capacity. For sim-
plicity sake, we will denote vi(Ei,θi,y− pi
h) and wi(θi,y− pi
h) as vi(y) and wi(y),
respectively.
Proposition 4 In equilibria in which E1 <E 2 and θ1 >θ 2 with u(E1,θ1) <
u(E2,θ2), income mixing will characterize equilibrium if and only if nr <n 1.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that income mixing indeed characterizes equilibrium when
nr <n 1 if θ1 >θ 2:
Note that if nr <n 1 (and hence nu >n 2), p1
h ≥ p2
h cannot hold in equilibrium.
The reason is that all households in the public sector would want to live in 2, but that
neighborhood capacity is insuﬃcient. In turn, p1
h <p 2
h ⇒ w1(y) >w 2(y), ∀y>p 2
h.
Hence, all households using a private school live in 1. Moreover, because nu >n 2
both neighborhoods are inhabited by households in the public sector. Proposition
2, part 1, then implies that these households are perfectly segregated by income
across neighborhoods, with low income ones living in 1. Finally, note that θ1 >θ 2
requires households from the highest income interval to mix in neighborhood 1 with
low income households. That is to say, requires the richest households in the economy
to opt for a private school. Otherwise, again by proposition 2, they would form the set
of households living in 2 and this neighborhood’s mean income would be the largest,
contradicting θ1 >θ 2.
Now we prove that in any other situation equilibrium will exhibit perfect income
segregation. This must hold if either nr >n 1 or nr = n1:
• nr >n 1 ⇒ p1
h >p 2
h. To prove it note that if p1
h were lower or equal to p2
h all
households using a private school would prefer to live in 1, where land is not
enough for housing all of them. In this case some households using a private
26school must live in 2. The lower housing price in neighborhood 2 compensates
them for the lower level of social capital they enjoy there. Proposition 3, part
1, then implies that in this case, households opting for a private alternative are
perfectly segregated by income across neighborhoods, with higher income ones
living in 1. On the other hand, p1
h >p 2
h ⇒ v2(y) >v 1(y), ∀y>p 1
h. Hence, all
households in the public sector reside in 2. Finally, note that by proposition 1
if a neighborhood is inhabited by households who use the local public school
and by households who choose instead a private alternative, it exhibits perfect
income segregation across schools, with higher income households sending their
youths to a private school. All this implies the following segregation patterns
(from left to right we specify households’ choices as income grows from y to y):
pub2-pr2-pr1.
• If nr = n1 and p1
h ≥ p2
h, v2(y) >v 1(y),∀y>p 1
h. Hence, all households using a









= z0(y − p1
h − x1(θ1,y− p1
h)) (12)
By assumption 3 x1(·) > 0 ∀y>p 1
h which, given p1
h ≥ p2




h). Strict concavity of z(b), then, implies that w1(y) grows
faster than v2(y) with income. Given that each option is preferred by a set of
households in the economy, continuity of direct and indirect utility functions
implies the existence of an income level e y which makes households indiﬀerent
27between both alternatives. It is straightforward to show that this income level
satisﬁes: v2(y) >w 1(y), ∀y<e y and w1(y) >v 2(y), ∀y>e y.
• Finally, if nr = n1 and p1
h <p 2
h, w1(y) >w 2(y),∀y>p 2
h.C o n s e q u e n t l y , a l l
households choosing a private school live in 1, while those using a public option
locate in 2. Because households with the lowest level of income in the economy
prefer a public option by assumption, v2(y) >w 1(y). Again, as each option
is preferred by a set of households in the economy, continuity of direct and
indirect utility functions implies the existence of at least one level of income e y
which makes households indiﬀerent between both alternatives and below which
households prefer PUB2.T h i si m p l i e sw1(y) crosses v2(y) from below in (y,U)
space at y = e y. Given strict concavity of z(b) this will only happen if e y − p2
h >
e y − p1
h − x1(θ1, e y − p1
h). And, as school quality is a normal good, this implies
y − p2
h >y− p1
h − x1(θ1,y− p1
h) and w1(y) >v 2(y), ∀y>e y. Therefore, all
households with income above e y choose PR1 and the allocation of households
to neighborhoods exhibits perfect income segregation.
In case (c) the relative mass of households choosing each educational sector is
determinant. If the mass of households opting for a private school who live in neigh-
borhood 1 is smaller than that neighborhood capacity and make θ1 >θ 2,i n c o m e
mixing will characterize equilibrium.The properties equilibria of this type satisfy are
similar to those of a model without neighborhood eﬀects (see Martínez-Mora, 2003
for the kind of segregation patterns that may emerge in this equilibria). Households
acquiring private education prefer living in the neighborhood with the lowest price
of housing where they mix with low income households. Such an allocation of house-
holds to locations is sustained as an equilibrium because the resulting demographic
28composition generates more beneﬁcial externalities in neighborhood 1. That is to say,
because the mix of low and high income households in neighborhood 1 yields a higher
level of mean income. The interesting and counter-intuitive conclusion one can draw
from proposition 4 is that neighborhood eﬀects in some circumstances strengthen the
incentives for income mixing private education introduces in residence-based public
schooling systems. Nevertheless, if the mass of households in the private sector ex-
ceeds (or if it is equal to) the capacity of the neighborhood endowed with the worse
public school, equilibrium will be characterized by perfect income segregation. The
reason is that low income households are outbid from neighborhood 1 and live in 2,
where they use the local public school. In this case, the segregation patterns that
arise in equilibrium are (from left to right we specify households’ choices as income
grows from y to y): pub2-pr2-pr1,i fnr >n 1,o rpub2-pr1,i fnr = n1. Hence, neigh-
borhood eﬀects can also bring back the classical perfect income segregation result from
urban public ﬁnance models without private alternatives.
         Cases (a) and (b) As we explained ab ove , t he analysis of cases ( a) and
(b) is equivalent. For this reason, we just analyse case (a). To begin with, we state
the following lemma about the equilibrium behavior of housing prices:
Lemma 3 In equilibria in which both E1 <E 2 and θ1 <θ 2: p1
h <p 2
h.
Proof. This result follows directly from propositions 2 and 3.
In case (a) parents choose among the four school sector-location alternatives
(PUB1, PR1, PUB2 and PR2). They face several trade-oﬀs when making this choice.
Public education is tuition-free but the private sector can oﬀer higher quality school-
ing. Parents may opt for a higher quality public school instead but this is made at a
cost as housing prices are usually higher the better the neighborhood public school.
29Location choice is also related to neighborhood demographic composition. Housing
in neighborhood 1 is cheaper but the externalities a household is exposed to are more
beneﬁcial in neighborhood 2.
Due to the richness of the model, diﬀerent types of segregation patterns across
neighborhoods may arise in equilibrium. Given the objectives of this paper, we will
simply show that some of them lead to income mixing while others exhibit perfect
income segregation. We will prove this through two examples of equilibrium, as the
theoretical analysis becomes intractable soon. We consider an economy described by
the model in section 2 with two neighborhoods. We assume the following separable





b1−σ + δx1−σ + γθ1−σ¤
;σ,δ,γ > 0 (13)
This utility function is strictly concave for σ,δ,γ > 0. Further, we suppose the in-
come distribution function is a uniform distribution. Finally, we assume the function
relating a neighborhood’s mean income with its level of social capital is:
θ = η + φ(y);φ>0 (14)
Example 2 in table 1 demonstrates that income mixing may characterize equilib-
rium in such case. However, example 1 proves that this is not guaranteed, as perfect
income segregation may also be the outcome of the model. The explanation is the
following: there may exist high income households whose demand for school quality
exceeds the level oﬀered by the best public school and consequently decide to send
their children to a private school. As for choosing where to live, these households must
balance neighborhood quality (which is higher in 2) against housing prices (lower in
1). If some of them prefer the combination oﬀered by neighborhood 1, as in example
2, income mixing will arise. If not, as it happens in example 1, equilibrium will be
characterized by perfect income segregation.
30Table 1. Examples of equilibrium
Example 1 Example 2
Perfect income segregation Income mixing
Public school quality 1 (E1) 2.5 2
Public school quality 2 (E2) 2.8 2.5
Social capital 1 (θ1) 4 5.4
Social capital 2 (θ2) 7 6
Social capital function φ=0.060 φ=0.341
parameters η=2.626 η=3.684
Mean income 1 22.9 50.24
Mean income 2 72.9 67.81
Price of housing 1 (ph1) 3 3
Price of housing 2 (ph2) 4.5 4.3
Community 1 size (N1) 0.358 0.733
Community 2 size (N2) 0.642 0.267





Parameters: σ=2.23; δ=0.0032; γ=0.005
Uniform income distribution function: ymin=5; ymax=105
*From left to right we specify households’ choices as income grows.
**b1:highest income households choosing PUB1;
b2:highest income households choosing PUB2;
b3:highest income households choosing PR1.
Therefore, while private education is a necessary condition for income mixing,
neighborhood eﬀects may prevent it from generating an allocation of households to
neighborhoods which does not exhibit perfect income segregation. Unfortunately, as
nu, nr, θ1 and θ2 are endogenous variables, there is nothing exogenous that determines
whether income mixing will characterize equilibrium or not. In fact, as in most
models with neighborhood eﬀects (Durlauf, 2004), the existence of multiple equilibria
exhibiting diﬀerent segregation patterns seems to be the natural outcome of this
model.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper has analysed how neighborhood eﬀects and private education interact in
shaping the allocation of households to neighborhoods and schools in an urban setting
31with a residence-based public education system. One objective was to investigate the
possibility that private education reduces income segregation across neighborhoods.
As a by-product, the analysis also provided interesting results about the impact of
neighborhood eﬀects on sector choice within a given location.
With respect to the latter issue, the analysis clariﬁed how the interactions be-
tween social capital and school quality in the process of human capital accumulation
may aﬀect sector choice. If social capital and school quality are complements in gen-
erating human capital, demand for school quality will be larger the higher the local
level of social capital. If the quality of the local public school is ﬁxed, then, this will
increase private school attendance. If on the contrary, social capital and school qual-
ity are substitutes in the human capital production function, a larger level of social
capital will reduce demand for school quality. This eﬀect would, ceteris paribus,l e a d
to lower private school attendance rates. Finally, if public school quality increases
with social capital as it may well happen, higher levels of social capital would, ceteris
paribus, reduce the number of households opting-out of public education. Therefore,
private school attendance may rise or fall in response to an increase in the level of
social capital. We commented on some empirical evidence which suggests the exis-
tence of an inverse relationship between social capital and private school attendance.
Whether these results arise because public school quality increases with social capital,
because social capital and school quality are substitutes or for both reasons remains
nevertheless unanswered. More empirical research on the issue is therefore needed.
Regarding the other question of interest to this paper, the analysis yielded the
following results. First of all, it provided a simple technical condition guaranteeing
the emergence of perfect income segregation across locations when these diﬀer along
more than two dimensions (in this case social capital, public school quality and hous-
ing prices) and there are no private alternative. Second, it revealed that, in urban
32economies, a higher level of household income does not automatically lead to con-
sumption of higher quality schooling. Suppose the best out of two neighborhoods in
terms of their level of social capital has a public school of lower quality. If the diﬀer-
ence in social capital is large enough so as to compensate households using a public
school for the diﬀerence in school quality, higher income households will renounce
to some school quality in order to live where social capital provides more beneﬁcial
contextual eﬀects. Third, the analysis showed that private education is not suﬃcient
for the emergence of income mixing within neighborhoods. We showed that private
education cannot guarantee that perfect income segregation across neighborhoods
does not arise in equilibrium. The reason is that neighborhood eﬀects constitute a
segregating force by themselves and may inhibit incentives households opting-out of
public education have to live in low housing price-low income neighborhoods. This
may occur if better public schools are located in neighborhoods providing more ben-
eﬁcial contextual eﬀects. If this is not the case, neighborhood eﬀects will indeed
promote income mixing within neighborhoods.
To sum up, this investigation suggests that whether private education induces
income integration across neighborhoods or not depends on the kind of equilibrium
to which the economy tends. Further resarch about which factors determine the
emergence of each type of equilibrium should provide interesting additional insights.
More generally, empirical research on the impact of private education on the levels
of income segregation across neighborhoods is necessary.
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